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As the Virginia governor, Thomas Jefferson, sat
down to meet with Jean Baptiste Ducoigne in 1781, he did
not know what to expect from the chief of the Kaskaskia
who traveled to Virginia from the Illinois Country. The
Americans had limited but peaceful contact with Illinois
Indians. Ducoigne approached this meeting as many of his
ancestors had when they first encountered Frenchmen in
the Great Lakes region over 100 years before.
He began the meeting with an exchange of gifts and
the smoking of the calumet. Jefferson gave Ducoigne a
medal as a gift, while Ducoigne offered painted buffalo
skins. These were not simply diplomatic procedures
for the Kaskaskia chief, but instead the gifts and rituals
symbolized the opportunistic nature of the Illinois
Indians as well as their longstanding policy of forming
alliances with European powers. The painted buffalo skins
exemplified how proficient the Illinois Indians had become
at not only hunting the buffalo but also transforming it into
art.
From an American perspective, Jefferson was trying
to extend his friendship by showing that his people were
not like the British; they were willing to work with the
Kaskaskia, much like the French did. Jefferson left this
meeting with a sense of how a successful alliance with
the Illinois could later open up inroads into the Illinois
Country or at least quell fighting among other Native
Americans in the region. Jean Baptiste Ducoigne left
this meeting with a very different mindset. Much like
his ancestors, Ducoigne hoped to forge a mutual alliance
with the Americans to promote trade and strengthen his
people’s position in the Illinois Country.
The Illinois Indians were an opportunistic group,
and the Illinois experience in the eighteenth century must
be coupled with their experience with the Americans to
explain why the Illinois felt an alliance with the United
States was their best option. This article will not only show
why the Illinois Indians chose to side with the Americans,

but also the consequences of their actions. The decision
to align with the United States caused both internal and
external problems for the Illinois Indians. Internally, it
led to the splitting of the Peoria from the Illinois, while
externally it resulted in constant attacks from other Native
American groups. Together, these problems made it
increasingly difficult for the Illinois to negotiate favorable
treaties with the United States.
To understand the Illinois Indians’ decisions, it is
crucial to recognize their motives. The very nature of the
Illinois’ coming to the Illinois Country illustrates their
resourcefulness and adaptability when faced with unstable
conditions. The Illinois were relative newcomers to the
region and were not descendants of the large city-state
of Cahokia. Instead, they were an Algonquian speaking
people who moved west into the Illinois Country from the
Ohio Valley during the 1600s. The Illinois left the Ohio
Valley as it was suffering from climate change that made
agriculture difficult. The struggle for resources caused a
period of violence and warfare that made it quite difficult
for these Algonquian groups to survive.1 Small settlements
survived by trading with the Oneota people who moved
into the Cahokia region after the city-state’s demise. In
the 1500s, the Algonquian groups of the Ohio Valley and
the Oneota people in the Illinois Country began to trade
prestige items and other goods across a trade network that
spanned modern-day Indiana.2 It is here where we can
see small pieces of a distinctive Illinois culture coming
together. For example, the calumet pipe, a diplomatic tool
used by many of the western Siouan-speakers, came into
the Algonquian culture through this trade. The Illinois
Indians used the calumet extensively, and they were able
to blend several aspects of Algonquian and Oneota culture
to form an Illinois culture that differed from many other
Great Lakes people the French would encounter.3
The Illinois also took advantage of a large-scale
movement of bison into the Midwestern grasslands from

A view of Monks Mound, Cahokia, Illinois. (Image: Gerald Rogers)

Left–View from Fort Kaskaskia overlooking the Mississippi River and where the Kaskaskia village was located. (Image:
Gerald Rogers)
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Population Estimates for the Illinois
Years

Kaskaskia
Total Population

Years

Peoria

Total Population

1675–1677

5,950–6,250

1673

8,000 in 3 villages

1707

2,200 includes Tamaroa

1707

3,000

1750

900 includes Michigamea and Cahokia

1750

1,000

1800

100

1800

400

By1832, the combined population of the Kaskaskia and Peoria was reduced to a single village of 300. (Figures from
Emily J. Blassingham, “The Depopulation of the Illinois Indians Part 2,” Ethnohistory 3, 4 (Autumn 1956): 362–72.)

the west. Between 1500 and 1800, an influx of bison
brought tremendous change to native life in the Illinois
Country, and the Illinois took full advantage of this
situation. The bison transformed the grasses of the prairie
from a farming nuisance into a productive source of
calories. Bison changed the Illinois into the only bisonbased Algonquian group, which emphasized the Illinois’
ability to adapt and take advantage of their surroundings.4
A shift from an agricultural source of calories quickly
shifted to a hunting- and animal-based diet. One
archeological study suggests that when Europeans began
to enter the Illinois Country, the majority of meat in the
Illinois diet was from bison.5
Bison hunting began to shape the Illinois way of life
and demanded a communal form of hunting that varied
drastically from the solitary style of deer hunting. Robert
Michael Morrissey argues that this style of hunting helped
to form a more unified and cohesive society, a way of
life that required larger villages which stayed together
throughout the year. Instead of breaking into small
villages to chase deer and bears like many Algonquian
groups, the Illinois came together in large villages,
especially during the summer and winter months, to hunt
bison.6 Bison hunting helped make the Illinois prosperous
by allowing them to have an abundance of food and
engage in other artistic endeavors. For instance, hide
painting became an important medium that the Illinois
employed well into the nineteenth century. Even upon
contact, Jesuit explorer Father Jacques Marquette (1637–
1675), noticed how the Illinois “use the hides for making
fine Robes, which they paint in various Colors.”7 The
Illinois’ commitment to the bison illustrates an additional
way in which they made the most of their situation while
forming a distinct Illinois culture.
The Illinois Indians opportunistically settled the
Illinois Country and strategically positioned themselves
as middlemen between the Algonquian- and Siouanspeaking people. Their mixed cultural traits and
positioning between these two worlds helped them thrive
in one very large aspect of their culture: the slave trade.
Like many other Algonquian groups, kinship played a
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prominent role in the Illinois culture and was a crucial
factor in the Illinois slave trade. Establishing a broad
kinship network often meant gaining status or power in
trade, warfare, and politics.8 The centrality of kinship
networks to the Illinois and other Algonquian groups

Contraction of Illinois Indian territory, 1650–1832. Map by Robert E.
Warren and James S. Oliver, Illinois State Museum. (Image: Robert E.
Warren and John A. Walthall. 1998. Illini Indians in the Illinois Country,
1673–1832. The Living Museum, 60(1): 4-8.)

be overlooked. These offerings
explains how slave raids
highlight the fact that the
helped to replace the deceased
Illinois took advantage of their
members of these kinship
proximity to and the resources
networks. Captives could be
of the Illinois Country to forge
adopted into the family to
replace the dead. A Jesuit in the
a unique culture that blended
Illinois Country explained this
both Algonquian and Siouan
practice as “resuscitating the
cultures. By using the bison and
dead.” He stated, “When there
optimizing the slave trade, the
is any man to be resuscitated,
Illinois positioned themselves
that is to say, if any one of
favorably in the Illinois Country
their warriors has been killed
and were often feared by their
. . . they give to this cabin one
Native American neighbors. The
of the prisoners, who takes the
Menominee warned Marquette
places of the deceased; and this
before he arrived with the Illinois
is what they call ‘resuscitating
to not travel any further south
the dead.’”9 However, only true
than the Fox River. Beyond the
strangers could take the place of
river lived the Illinois, who were
the dead. Algonquian-speaking
“ferocious people.”13 The Illinois
captives were often useless
colonized the Illinois Country
because they would have to be
through aggression, fear, and
adopted into a kinship network
trade. They continued to employ
where they already had ties.
these same techniques well after
For the Algonquian people of
contact and into negotiations
the Great Lakes, the Siouanwith the United States. The
speaking groups from the west
political structure of the Illinois
made excellent candidates for
before European contact has
The lower Illinois Country as the Kaskaskia
slaves because they had no
been debated by historians,
understood it in the late seventeenth and early
kinship ties to the Algonquian
but the word “confederacy” is
eighteenth centuries. (Image: Edward S. Ellis, The
world. Since strangers were
useful when examining Illinois
History of our Country: From the Discovery of
needed to replace the kinship
political decisions.14 Each village
America to the Present Time, 8 vols, 1910)
within the confederacy was equal
networks, the Illinois had a
and relatively autonomous, but
strategic advantage when it
they met together regularly to reach important political
came to the slave trade.
decisions as a cohesive unit. The Illinois had strong
Situated between the Great Lakes and the Siouanspeaking tribes of the west, the Illinois displayed their
opportunistic nature by becoming middlemen along this
A depiction of Father Jacques Marquette and Louis Jolliet at
slave-trade route. Throughout the 1600s, the Illinois were
the village of Kaskaskia at Starved Rock in 1673. Painting
engaged in wars with several groups in the Missouri
done by artist Robert Thorn for the state’s sesquicentennial in
Valley to obtain slaves. The Pawnee, Osage, Missouri,
1968. (Image: Northern Illinois University Archives)
and other smaller groups to the south and west bore the
brunt of Illinois slaving raids. The Illinois viewed these
groups as a convenient and vulnerable source of slaves
for the Indian slave trade that thrived in the Great Lakes
region.10 The Illinois even engaged in war with both the
Iroquois to the east and Siouan tribes to the west at the
same time. While the Jesuit priest Claude Allouez (1622–
1689) saw this as a reckless act, it was actually an example
of the Illinois being opportunistic in the slave trade.11
The Illinois were resourceful enough to realize that their
position in the Illinois Country was an advantage.
When Marquette first arrived at an Illinois village in
1673, he was greeted by a dance featuring the calumet
pipe, treated to a feast of bison meat, offered belts and
garters from Illinois Indians wearing buffalo skins, and
even presented with a slave.12 This routine is strikingly
similar to the gifts and procedures of Ducoigne’s visit
with Thomas Jefferson. There is a sense of continuity and
similarity of mindset between the two visits that cannot
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George Catlin, Pah-me-cow-ee-tah, or Man Who Tracks, a
Peoria Illinois Chief, 1830. (Image: Illinois State Museum)

ethnic and cultural bonds well before European contact.
For instance, when Marquette arrived at the village of
Peoria in the 1670s, he asked to whom he was speaking
and the answer was, “We are Illinois.”15 This collection
of groups identified ethnically as Illinois, but there was
also a political side to the term “Illinois.” The Illinois
confederacy had a great chief, and Marquette made note
of this fact when he was taken to Kaskaskia where he was
told the great chief lived.16 Despite this position of a great
chief, the Illinois did not form a chiefdom because the
great chief did not have a great deal of power. Instead, the
great chief was a hereditary position held by the chief of
the Kaskaskia, and his primary function was to regulate
meetings between the bands rather than to monopolize
power. The Illinois confederacy met periodically to go to
war as a unit, decide the fate of slaves captured in battle,
negotiate for trade items with other Native Americans,
and discuss possible alliances both with Europeans and
other Indians. During these meetings, the chiefs of all the
villages would gather for feasts and resolve political issues
under the direction of the great chief. The confederacy,
then, was one of mutual support and collective decisionmaking.
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The relative autonomy of various bands within the
Illinois confederacy provided them the flexibility to
adapt to Europeans in divergent ways. As the eighteenth
century progressed, the localized autonomy of some
bands strengthened, eventually fracturing the Illinois
confederacy. The political and cultural differences among
the bands allowed divisions to occur that weakened and
eventually supplanted the larger Illinois confederacy. The
individual bands chose to dissolve their confederacy as a
way to protect their way of life. From the late eighteenth
and into the nineteenth century, the bands among the
Illinois confederacy prioritized local decisions over the
goals of the larger confederacy. Factions within the larger
Illinois confederacy formed and gained autonomy from
the confederacy to create separate political and cultural
entities. The local autonomy allowed for some bands
to alter their culture and political structure much more
drastically than other bands, while the internal policies of
the Illinois confederacy shifted to adjust to, align with, or
reject the various incoming European nations.
For the Illinois confederacy the eighteenth century
was a major turning point because some bands were
simultaneously coming together while others began
to fragment. This dual process of coalescence and
fragmentation occurred differently for each band. Some
smaller factions of the Illinois confederacy became
absorbed into larger groups, but at the same time there
was a pivotal split occurring between the Kaskaskia and
Peoria that pulled the Illinois confederacy in different
directions. The smaller bands slowly gravitated toward
either the Kaskaskia or Peoria and eventually combined
with them. The Cahokia, Michigamea, and parts of the
Tamaroa followed the Kaskaskia strategy of aligning
themselves with a European nation to promote trade,
seek protection, gain material goods, or disseminate
the Christian religion. The Peoria, on the other hand,
chose to use a strategy that often distanced them from
Europeans while outright rejecting the Christian religion.
By the end of the eighteenth century, it is clear that the
bands had become autonomous entities, and the Illinois
confederacy collapsed. Instead of uniting to preserve
the culture of the Illinois, the local autonomy of the
bands allowed the different groups to diverge in order to
preserve their respective vision of an Illinois culture. The
localized structure of the Illinois confederacy gave them a
mechanism to survive in a way quite different from most
groups. Instead of coming together to preserve the larger
group, the Illinois endured by separating into smaller,
localized groups.
In addition, the geographical distance between the
Kaskaskia and Peoria often strained the limits of the
confederacy and helped to promote local decisions. Before
the eighteenth century, the Peoria and Kaskaskia lived
relatively close to each other in the Starved Rock region
on the Illinois River in present-day northern Illinois. In the
fall of 1700, the Illinois faced a split with the Kaskaskia,
moving southward to the west bank of the Mississippi
River. Three years later the Kaskaskia moved again,
50 miles further south near the mouth of the Kaskaskia

River.17 With a heavy reliance on European goods, the
Kaskaskia moved southward to be close to the Louisiana
Territory. Father Jacques Gravier (1651–1708) believed
that the only thing that stopped the Kaskaskia from
entering the Louisiana Territory was their strong Catholic
ties to the mission.18 This left the two main areas of Illinois
concentration near Lake Peoria and the mouth of the
Kaskaskia River.
The Peoria protested this move by the Kaskaskia, but
ultimately they could not force the Kaskaskia to stay. The
geographical distance was over 100 miles and helped to
ensure that these two bands would continue to develop in
separate ways. The French established forts and towns in
close proximity to the Kaskaskia, and the Kaskaskia began
to adopt many of the European ways of life. For instance,
the Kaskaskia established two mills for the production
of wheat.19 By 1763, there were also “two hundred acres
of cultivated land, a very good stock of cattle, and a
brewery.”20 The structure of the confederacy allowed
for strong localized bands with the ability to make many
political choices on their own, and the Peoria were left to
the north with a completely separate set of enemies from
the Kaskaskia.
The Illinois confederacy allowed for individual bands
to make a vast array of political decisions without the
approval or consent of the other bands. One of the main
reasons for the confederacy was to protect the similar
culture of the Illinois bands. However, the bands were
not obliged to protect the other bands during warfare,
and no village could force another village into conflict.
For instance, if the Peoria felt threatened by the Sioux,
they could meet with the other villages and ask for their
warriors’ help. However, if the elders of the other villages
did not or could not provide help to the Peoria, then
the Peoria fought the Sioux alone. There were several
instances when all of the bands would provide warriors to
fight off the Iroquois in the seventeenth century or the Fox
during the early part of the eighteenth century. However,
as time progressed the bands often began to favor more
localized reasons for going to war. Instead of protecting a
common culture or Illinois confederacy, they often chose
to fight battles more relevant to their respective local
politics.
The close alliance between the Kaskaskia and French
often left the Kaskaskia making the decision to side with
the French militarily, with the Kaskaskia joining them
on several raids and battles against French enemies. For
instance, in 1733 and 1736, the Kaskaskia participated
in French-led expeditions against the Chickasaw. In the
latter trip, more than 100 warriors from the Mississippi
River villages took part in the expedition.21 During the
1740s, Cherokee towns were even raided by French forces
with the help of the Kaskaskia.22 The Chickasaw and
Cherokee were not local enemies for the Kaskaskia, but
the Kaskaskia used their warrior population to help build a
strong alliance with the French. While these decisions did
strengthen this alliance, it often left the Peoria more than
a hundred miles to the north to defend their territory by
themselves.

Portrait of Jacques Marquette on the memorial stele in the St.
Ignace Mission, St. Ignace, Michigan. (Image: Collections of
the Chateau Remezay)

The location of the Peoria also made them more
susceptible to attacks from the Sioux. While the Peoria
fought valiantly against these outside groups, they were
beginning to waver in the 1750s after being attacked
several years in a row. When the Peoria asked for help
from the Kaskaskia or even for a French officer to be
stationed among them, their request was not granted in
time. The Peoria then lobbied the Cahokia and Tamaroa
bands of the Illinois to join them at Lake Peoria, but to no
avail.23 The Peoria were truly left to defend their land for
themselves.
The Peoria’s isolation did not mean that they were
isolated from conflict and difficult decisions. After
surviving numerous enemy attacks without much support
from the other Illinois bands, the Peoria made the
conscious choice to move west of the Mississippi River
into Spanish Territory after the British began to enter the
Illinois Country.
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was
not an ideal time for the Illinois Indians. Throughout
their history, the Illinois resourcefully took advantage of
everything from the buffalo of the prairie to their Native
American neighbors they used for slaves. However, the
tides began to change when the Illinois bands began to
separate and elect for a peaceful relationship with the
United States. Renewed violence with the Foxes in the
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by other tribes for their
1770s helped to reduce
alliance with the United
the warrior population
States. In 1804 and 1805,
of the Illinois down to a
mere 300 warriors.24 While
the Potawatomi raided the
the Peoria sought refuge
Kaskaskia and took several
across the Mississippi
prisoners. The Kaskaskia
River in Spanish Territory,
survived these attacks, but
the Kaskaskia stayed east
their weakened warrior
of the Mississippi, either
population led Ducoigne
near Kaskaskia or further
to use a more diplomatic
south with the Quapaw.25
approach toward his
The Fox, Kickapoos, and
enemies.
Potawatomis continued
Ducoigne knew that
to harass the Kaskaskia
with his declining warriors
throughout the eighteenth
he could not oppose the
century; with a decreasing
Potawatomi in an open
population, Kaskaskia
war. Instead, he tried to
chiefs had to take this threat
persuade them to join the
very seriously.
Kaskaskia and oppose
Ducoigne, the
the Osage, against whom
Kaskaskia chief, decided
the Potawatomi often
to support the United
went to war. Ducoigne
States over his Native
invited the Potawatomi
American enemies who
chief Saugeenawk and
aligned themselves with the
his Kaskaskia wife to a
British. Much like previous
friendly visit.28 It was
here that Ducoigne most
chiefs, Ducoigne chose to
likely unveiled his plan
go against his traditional
that the Potawatomi join
Native American enemies,
and the Kaskaskia even
Painted deer hide featuring arrowhead and broken diamond Ducoigne and form a
motif, attributed to the Illinois Indians, before 1796. (Image:
partnership against the
joined in the Revolutionary
Buffalo Bill Center of the West)
Osage. In March of 1805,
War on the side of the
he threatened that 3,000
Americans. While most
warriors were marching
of their Native American
from the Ohio Valley to punish the Osage for their raids
enemies sided with the British, the Kaskaskia aided the
and either destroy them or push them off their lands.29
rebels by hunting, scouting, and carrying correspondence.
Ducoigne figured that if he could channel aggression
Forming an alliance with the Americans may seem like a
away from his people and onto the Osage, he would be
reckless decision, but it was actually consistent with the
in a better position in the long run.30 The war with the
Kaskaskia’s longstanding policy to align themselves with
a powerful foreign nation. For the opportunistic Kaskaskia, Osage never materialized, but small-scale raids against
the Osage did increase dramatically. A short-lived peace
they sought a foreign ally who could help them regain
treaty among the Osage, Delaware, Miami, Potawatomi,
their prominence in the region over their Native American
Kickapoo, Sac, Fox, Sioux, and Kaskaskia was eventually
neighbors. Ducoigne became a staunch ally of George
signed in October of 1805.31 The increased pressure by
Rogers Clark when he took over the Illinois Country, and
Native American enemies forced Ducoigne to rely on
he even served as an American emissary to promote peace
foreign alliances, a trusted Kaskaskia tactic.
among the Wabash tribes and later to the Chickasaws.26
By positioning the Kaskaskia in an alliance with
Ducoigne was a shrewd negotiator on behalf of his
the Americans, Ducoigne made a calculated risk that the
Kaskaskia people. At a meeting where Ducoigne led a
Americans would prove themselves to be more useful
delegation of western Indians, he addressed Washington
allies than their Native American enemies and that the
on the encroachment of Kentuckians onto their land.
United States could tip the balance of power back to the
Ducoigne stated at the meeting, “I am a Kaskaskia, and
Kaskaskia. The same reasoning had been used to validate
have always been a good American from my youth
a French alliance in the beginning of the eighteenth
upwards.”32 Ducoigne stressed the fact that his people
century. However, this decision also made the Kaskaskia
never once shed the blood of an American and maintained
susceptible to Native Americans who openly opposed
a strong alliance with the American people. After the
the United States. For example, in 1790 the Kaskaskia
United States’ victory at Fallen Timbers in August of
suffered heavy losses in battle with the Potawatomi,
1794, negotiations were held in Greenville, Ohio, the
and in 1802 they were attacked by a series of Shawnee
following year to settle the peace. While Ducoigne and
war parties.27 The Kaskaskia continued to suffer attacks
his Kaskaskia people did not participate in the battle in
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any way, they were still
were not involved in this
included in the Greenville
treaty-making process. The
treaty. They received a
Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and
$500 annuity and did not
Michigamea received land,
have to cede any land.33
monetary compensation,
The Kaskaskia were being
and, most importantly,
rewarded for their alliance
a promise of protection
with the United States.
from the United States
This sense of elevated
against hostile incursions
status would come back
by other Native American
to haunt Ducoigne and
groups.34 This protection
his Kaskaskia people. The
was needed for the Illinois,
other Native Americans
who had been living in a
surrounding the Kaskaskia
“barbarous” region that
became increasingly
had been plagued with
hostile, especially after
violence since the French
Ducoigne signed away
left.35 The Illinois Indians
thousands of acres of
faced constant attacks
disputed land in an 1803
during this period, and
treaty. The land that
they desperately sought the
Ducoigne ceded to the
protection that this treaty
United States was an
offered. However, article
area that the Kaskaskia
two of the treaty not only
had used for hunting in
allowed for protection
previous decades, but by
by the United States, but
also implied a dominion
1803 the Kickapoos were
by the United States over
firmly established on this
these Illinois bands. This
land. This action caused
is strikingly similar to
Ducoigne strife with the
article three of the treaties
Kickapoos, but he avoided
Kaskaskia Indian. (Image: Engraving from a sketch by
signed at Portage des Sioux
ceding the land where the
General George-Victor Collot, 1796)
in 1815. Those Native
Kaskaskia lived. Despite
Americans agreed “to be
giving up hunting ground,
under the protection of the
Ducoigne retained enough
United Sates, and of no other nation, power, or sovereign,
land near the Mississippi River to sustain the Kaskaskia.
whatsoever.”36 These treaties helped open the door for
Thus, instead of giving up his own land, Ducoigne sold
American expansion, as well as American authority over
out his enemies to strengthen his alliance with the United
western tribes.
States. The signing of this treaty sparked some hostile
The Peoria signed a separate treaty with the United
exchanges between the Kickapoo and the Kaskaskia,
States in 1818 that confirmed their split with Kaskaskia.
and Ducoigne sought the protection of the United States.
The Peoria, also decimated by a declining population,
Governor Harrison wrote to the Kickapoos to say that
sought the protection of the other Illinois bands. Since
the United States would not tolerate a war against the
the mid-eighteenth century, the Peoria had largely settled
Kaskaskia. Harrison then told Ducoigne and his people
separately from the other bands, but years of warfare had
to seek protection in the American village. These were
taken their toll on them. This treaty stated that the Peoria
minimal measures compared to what the Kaskaskia were
lived apart from the other tribes and were not part of the
used to from the French.
previous treaty in 1803, so they did not reap any of the
The splitting of the Illinois Confederacy occurred
benefits of the annuities paid to the other bands.37 In this
during the second half of the eighteenth century, but we
treaty, the Peoria signed away the remaining lands south
can begin to see the effects of this split in the treaties of
and east of the Illinois River that was not ceded by the
the nineteenth century. The Illinois never had a formal
Kaskaskia. In return, the Peoria received annuities from
treaty with the French, but it was an alliance based on
the United States in addition to the “immediate care and
mutual assistance. The French provided trade goods and
patronage” as well as the “protection” of the United States
formed kinship bonds to strengthen this relationship.
against other Indian tribes.38 This language of care and
However, with the Illinois separating into smaller bands,
we can see a move toward a more local concern in treaties. protection runs through many of the Native American
treaties of this region. However, the governmental reach
For instance, in the 1803 treaty the Kaskaskia, Cahokia,
of the Unites States often did little to protect the Illinois.
and Michigamea sought money for a priest in the region
This might be one reason why the Peoria amalgamated
as well as funds to build a church. The Peoria never fully
themselves back into the Illinois confederacy. Even
accepted the ideas of Christianity, so it is obvious they
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though the Illinois confederacy was a shell of its former
prominence, there was still more protection to be offered
from the kinship between bands rather than the distant
United States government.
The Illinois began the eighteenth century as dominant
players in the region by making strategic alliances with
European nations. Over the course of a century, these
two groups made decisions that would benefit local bands
rather than the larger political entity. This emphasis on
local autonomy ultimately led to the fracturing of the
Illinois bands that would not be resolved until they were
forced to unite in the nineteenth century to survive hostile

incursions. Peaceful overtures to the United States did not
guarantee peace in the region for the Illinois, who suffered
attacks from enemies who despised their decision to side
with the Americans. The American treaties weakened the
position of the Illinois and opened this region for later
expansion. The peaceful action of negotiating with the
United States opened up the Illinois to many unforeseen
consequences that included violent outside attacks from
rival Native Americans and the fracturing of the Illinois
Confederacy.
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